A number of accounts given by participants in the ‘45 have come down to us. But there are many points on which they disagree. Who, or what, are we to believe? Was Charles close to the front line at the Battle of Culloden or at the rear. Was his horse shot under him, as two of the eye-witnesses insist? Did he have to be persuaded to leave the field or did he flee as soon as the tide of battle turned against him, prompting Lord Elcho, his follower and one time friend to say ‘There you go for a damned cowardly Italian!'

These are the kinds of questions that drove Professor Youngson, one of Scotland's leading historians, to undertake his remarkable reexamination of the Jacobite Rebellion. He presents two versions of ‘45, one from the Hanoverian and one from the Jacobite point of view. In order to do so, he has to adopt two different characters and two corresponding sets of preferences and prejudices. In each account he includes only what he believes to be true, avoiding exaggeration or speculation. What he demonstrates is how, if one adopts two contrasting points of view, the same people and the same events can be described in two revealing different ways.

Thus in one half of the dual narrative we see Charles the heroic adventurer and brilliant military leader. In the other we see Charles the opportunist, cynical, heartless and irresponsible. Let's look at the first - the heroic leader in the all important battle of Culloden.

"At dawn on 14 April Charles left Inverness, taking with him all his available troops, and after giving orders that those who were still to reach Inverness should follow him with all speed to Culloden, three miles east of Inverness on the high road to Nairn. Charles had resolved to fight, and to fight at once. He had assumed effective command of the army, for his relations with Lord George had reached breaking point; and his orders were issued after discussion, not with Lord George and the chiefs, but with his favourite advisers such as O'Sullivan, Sheridan and a few of the Irish officers; for no Council of War was held after the retreat from Falkirk. The Prince's determination to give battle is not easily explained. It is possible that his French and Irish advisers found the idea of retiring to fight in the mountains strange and alarming, and that they, like the aged Sir Thomas Sheridan, were weary of campaigning and hoped for a miracle. Charles himself was by no means exhausted and he feared nothing; but he was always ready to fight without calculating the odds, he still believed that his men were irresistible, and he despised the idea of retreat before a Hanoverian army. He took the wrong advice, and in three days, 14 to 16 April, the Jacobite cause was irretrievably ruined by a series of tragically mistaken decisions taken by the Prince, under the influence of a small coterie of sycophantic admirers. What was decided, was to fight at the wrong time and in the wrong place. The timing was wrong because the army was considerably below strength. When Charles marched from Inverness to Culloden, Lochiel and Keppoch, with their regiments, had not returned from the siege of Fort William, although they were 'expected every hour'; Lord Cromarty and several other chiefs were in Sutherland with at least seven hundred men; and Cluny and the MacPhersons were still in Badenoch. In these circumstances it was folly to advance towards the enemy and move further away from badly needed reinforcements. But Charles was resolved to attack the carefully assembled forces of Cumberland - the expression he used, according to Lord George, was 'had he but a thousand men he would attack them'. Secondly, the choice of Culloden Moor invited defeat. The sensible plan, proposed by Lord George, Was to retire to a strong ground the other side of the water of Nairn; where, if the Duke of Cumberland should attack us, we were persuaded we could have given a good account of him; and if he did not venture to cross that water, and come up to us there, we proposed (if no opportunity offered to attack him to advantage) to retire farther, and draw him up to the mountains, where we thought, without doubt, we might attack him at some pass or strong ground.

This was no mere visionary scheme. Lord George had a particular place in mind, and two senior officers sent to view it confirmed that it was 'a very strong Ground . . such as the Highlanders would have liked very well, and would have thought themselves in a fair way of Victory had the Duke of Cumberland ventured to have passt the water of Neirn in their Sight, and atact them there'. As for the idea of the Hanoverian army pursuing the Jacobites into the Monadhliath Mountains, it invites the supposition that large numbers of the government troops would never have been seen again. Cumberland was no commander for rough country, whereas the highlanders were masters of mountain warfare. The government troops would have been exposed to continual harassment, outposts would have been picked off as they had been smoked off in Atholl, and one mistake by Cumberland might have resulted in a highland charge down a hillside as devastating as at Killiecrankie. But Charles would not retire into the hills."

Now let us look at the same battle from the other point of view:

"To understand why this unique opportunity was thrown away by the rebels, it is necessary to bear in mind two facts. First, although Charles knew very well that Cumberland was at Aberdeen and would march in the spring, and although he had had three months since the battle of Falkirk in which to lay his plans and collect his forces, he was caught largely unprepared. To some extent this was because the rebel army was plagued by the usual money and supply problems - little food and no pay - and many clansmen had therefore gone home to live for a while with their families, and had not yet returned. But it was also because elements of the army were still engaged in or were returning from operations elsewhere in the highlands. Lochiel was on his way back from the futile siege of Fort William; Lord Cromarty was in Sutherland, pursuing Loudon; Cluny MacPherson was still in Badenoch. With his forces thus dispersed, Charles may have wished to avoid yet another commitment, this time on the Spey; and it is said that the Duke of Perth was under orders not to engage the enemy. This may explain the rebels' inaction; but it does not justify it. Perth could have both damaged the enemy and delayed his advance without becoming heavily engaged, and this, especially any delay, would have been very valuable to the Jacobites. The second point is that there had been no Council of War since just after Falkirk. Charles took his own decisions, probably after consulting his Irish friends. The decision not to fight even a delaying action on the Spey was therefore probably his, and it was a decision that neither Lord George Murray nor Lochiel - nor probably any other of the chiefs - would have approved.

Two days after Cumberland crossed the Spey, Charles marched from Inverness to Culloden. He took all the troops that he could find and left orders for those that were not yet in the town to follow him as soon as possible. He had decided to seek a battle, and he had decided to fight it on Culloden Moor. It was his decision and his alone, and by all accounts it filled the chiefs and commanders with gloom - 'We were at variance within ourselves: Irish intriguers and French politics were too predominant in our councils'. That evening Lochiel arrived with his men from Fort William, and the rebel army spent the night among the gorse bushes and pine-trees of Culloden Wood. Charles and his principal lieutenants put up in Culloden House, the home of Duncan Forbes.

Having made one serious mistake on the Spey, Charles had now made another. Even if it is assumed that a battle had to be fought sooner rather than later, Culloden Moor was a very bad place for the Jacobites to fight. On such open and gently shelving ground two equally matched armies could have fought with an equal chance. But the rebels were fewer than 6,000 men to Cumberland's 9,000, and they were inferior in artillery and vastly inferior in cavalry. They were, in fact, outnumbered and outclassed, and their best chance -perhaps their only chance - was to fight on ground favourable to themselves. Lord George Murray and the chiefs understood this very well. They urged Charles 'to retire to a strong ground on the other side of the water of Nairn' which they had reconnoitered and where they were sure that the highland army, if the Duke were to attack, would be able to fight to much better advantage; and if not attacked, they 'proposed (if no opportunity offered to attack him to advantage) to retire farther, and draw him up to the mountains, where we thought, without doubt, we might attack him at some pass or strong ground'. This excellent advice was rejected, with disastrous consequences."

Ultimately, Professor Youngson argues, there is no clear dividing line between history and propaganda - ‘it is therefore for the reader to beware'.

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